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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the relationship between antidumping filings and macroeconomic factors 
in the US and the EU. A highly dispersed distribution of the number of openings of 
antidumping proceduresis confirmed with an over-dispersion test, which leads us to estimate a 
negative binomial rather than a Poisson model. Results of this estimation suggest that a real 
appreciation of the filing country‟s currency significantly increases the number of openings of 
antidumping inquiries both in the US and the EU. Fluctuations in the level of economic 
activity also influence antidumping filings in the US significantly: as one would expect, real 
GDP growth is negatively related to filings. However, we could not establish such a 
relationship in the EU. Lastly, increases in the import penetration rate appear to significantly 
increase antidumping filings in the US. Surprisingly, this relationship turns out to be the 
inverse in Europe. The particular time period selected assess the damage from dumping has a 
significant impact on our findings. 
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1. Introduction 
International trade relations are increasingly influenced by conflicts caused by “unfair 
competition” (actual or perceived). The resolution of these conflicts often takes the form of 
managed trade agreements (such as “voluntary” export retrains or “voluntary” import 
expansions). It may also lead to unilateral sanctions against unfair countries. Such measures 
have ambiguous effects: 
- On the one hand, it may be that these national decisions fundamentally support the 
functioning of a GATT-WTO system which was not designed to resolve the new 
competition problems on a multilateral basis and which is not yet able to do so. 
- On the other hand, it may be that these unilateral or bilateral solutions contribute 
erosion the efficiency of the GATT-WTO system, and may even pervert it, inasmuch as 
they become an additional source of trade restrictions of a new kind: a protectionism 
based on the diversion or even the perversion of international rules. 
Typically this new protectionism consists in diverting the WTO rules from their objectives, by 
using antidumping procedures
2
 not to promote fairness, but to protect domestic industries. 
The increase in antidumping cases leads us to question whether the procedure is really 
appropriate to its objective. Does it redress unfairness or does it create it? As the procedure 
has been designed and as it is applied, does it not further the development of a hidden 
protectionism, a protectionism which is camouflaging itself by putting on the cloak of fairness 
and the enforcement of international order? 
The antidumping measures instituted by the GATT (in its article 6) and specified by the 
Tokyo antidumping code and its revision during the Uruguay Rounds consist of three stages: 
first, the claim admissibility is examined, then the dumping margin is estimated, and last the 
damages‟ reality and importance are assessed. If the investigations determine that dumping is 
occurring and causing material injury, the national authorities impose an antidumping duty 
(tariff) on dumped imports equal to difference between the actual and the “fair” price, so as to 
offset the difference between the dumped price and the normal price. Another solution can be 
a commitment of the exporter to increase the price (price undertaking), to reduce the export 
quantities (such as a “voluntary” export restraint) or any other agreement which reduces the 
quantity of the alleged dumped imports
3
. 
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 Dumping literally means “to clear away or to remove”. It has come to mean “to get rid of merchandises at any 
price.” 
3
 These decisions can be made prior to the conclusion of the investigation. 
In order to be admissible, a complaint must meet three conditions: 
1. Petitioners must be supported by a significant part of the import-competing industry. 
2. Petitioners must provide certain information related to the alleged dumping practice, 
namely the amounts by which the import price has been reduced and the import quantities 
have increased. 
3. The similarity of the good produced by the plaintiffs to the import good. Only those 
companies which produce a good considered to be sufficiently similar to the alleged 
dumped import product are entitled to lodge a complaint. 
Empirical analyses of antidumping can be based on any one of three main approaches: 
simulation, case study and econometric analysis. Simulation is probably the most limited 
method, usually relying on static partial (sometimes general) equilibrium models which 
require questionable simplifying assumptions and calibration methods to establish the price 
elasticities and cross-price demand coefficients which characterize the industry (Maur, 1999). 
Case studies and econometric methods seem more promising as far as antidumping is 
concerned. Econometric methods in particular enable us to develop a dynamic model of 
macroeconomic factors prior to, during, and following antidumping actions, thus directly 
estimating the impacts of the decisions. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the influences 
of some macroeconomic factors on the number of antidumping initiations in the United States 
and in the European Union over the period 1990-2002. This investigation draws upon and 
seeks to provide an extension to previous papers studying this issue. 
In a pioneering paper, R. Feinberg (1989), investigated the causes of antidumping filings in 
the United States between 1982 and 1987 with a Tobit model. He focused his explanation on 
the 4 countries which are mostl often targeted by the US antidumping authorities: Japan, 
Brazil, Mexico and South Korea. Feinberg established that fluctuations in the real exchange 
rate are a significant factor in the opening of inquiries, especially for Japan. More precisely, 
he showed that the increase in antidumping procedures between 1982 and 1987 was 
significantly related to the weakness of the US dollar. In addition, Feinberg found evidence of 
a negative impact of growth in GDP on the number of filings. However, the discreet nature of 
the values taken by the number of openings of inquiries induces us to question the 
appropriateness of Tobit method. 
More recently, Feinberg (2003) used a negative binomial model in order to estimate the 
determinants of quarterly antidumping US petitions between 1981 and 1998. His conclusion 
was quite different: over this last period, US antidumping filings rose with the appreciation 
(not the depreciation) of the US dollar. Knetter and Prusa (2003) used the same technique 
(negative binomial estimation) for four of the most important antidumping users: Australia, 
Canada, the European Union and the United States. In Knetter and Prusa, the dependant 
variable is the number of filings occurring every year between 1980 and 1998. Surprisingly, 
neither Feinberg nor Knetter and Prusa take into account the possible influence of the import 
penetration rate. In our opinion, this macroeconomic variable must be considered for at least 
three reasons: 
- First an increase in the rate of import penetration means (or can be perceived to mean) 
more rigorous foreign competition. 
- Second the proof of material injury requires showing that the industry has experienced 
a sharp increase in imports.  
- Third the new WTO antidumping code (1994) reinforces the obligation of the 
reporting country to establish a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the 
damage suffered by the complainant industry. 
Furthermore, former studies neglected the impact of the period used to evaluate the damage.  
In Section 2, we first describe the data and the variables used in the analysis. In Section 3, we 
present the model and the estimation method which seems the most appropriate based on a 
preliminary test of over-dispersion. Finally, in Section 4 we present and interpret our main 
results and in Section 5 we present our main conclusions. 
2. Data, macroeconomic variables and relationships 
Our objective is to test the following hypotheses, both in the United States and in the 
European Union: 
H1. The number of antidumping filings increases with the real appreciation of the 
reporting country‟s currency.4 
H2. The number of inquiries opened decreases with an increase in the rate of growth of 
the import country‟s real GDP. The sensitivity of the business community to perceived 
foreign unfair pricing behavior is increased in an economic slump, as is the incentive of 
foreign firms to cut prices in order to maintain export volumes. At the same time, it 
becomes easier for the importing country to prove an injury during a slump or downturn 
in the economy. 
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 The literature on „monetary protectionism‟ notes that a country may devalue its domestic currency in order to 
boost its exports and improve its competitiveness in the trading partners‟ markets. However, such „monetary 
dumping‟ is not subject to the WTO antidumping code. 
H3. The number of antidumping actions rises with an increase in the rate of import 
penetration
5
 in the filing country. 
 
2.1. Data 
Most of the data used in this paper have been drawn from the WTO Trade Policies Review 
Division. Data on initiations of antidumping actions between 1990 and 2002 come from the 
WTO antidumping data base. The data are available, because WTO members are under a 
continuing obligation to report their antidumping actions to the WTO Secretariat (article VI). 
Tables 1 and 2 display the number of filings over the period 1990-2002. The figures show that 
the United States initiated twice as many inquiries as the European Union. If we consider the 
patterns of bilateral filings (of each initiating country against particular countries), the United 
States is the most active filer, with 292 actions among which 118 targeted the European 
Union. Conversely, the European Union aimed few of its initiations at the United States (11 
cases out of 133). The European Union mostly targeted Asian countries and especially China, 
which is the most affected country, both by the European Union and by the United States
6
. 
The maximum number of filings in any quarter is equal to 5 for the European Union, while it 
is equal to 22 for the United States.  
 
Table 1: US Antidumping petitions between 1990 and 2002 against selected target countries 
 (number of cases filed per quarter) 
 Target countries 
 European  
Union  
Korea Canada China Japan Five target 
countries 
Average 2.27 0.63 0.42 1.42 0.86 1.12 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 22 4 4 4 3 22 
Standard 
deviation 
3.62 0.97 0.87 1.30 0.79 1.95 
Total 118 33 22 74 45 292 
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 the import penetration rate is the ratio of imports to domestic demand 
6
 Even though the United States is the most important filing country, it is also one of the most targeted countries, 
followed by China, Japan and Korea. These 4 countries were cited in 30% of the antidumping procedures 
initiated between 1980 and 1998. 
Table 2: EU Antidumping petitions between 1990 and 2002 against selected target countries 
 (number of cases filed per quarter) 
 Target countries 
United States  Korea Canada China Japan Five target 
countries 
Average 0.21 0.61 0.02 1.29 0.42 0.51 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 1 3 1 5 3 5 
Standard 
deviation 
0.41 0.87 0.14 1.17 0.72 0.87 
Total 11 32 1 67 22 133 
 
2.2. Variables in the models 
In this study, we choose to focus on three factors among the various macroeconomic 
phenomena which are liable to influence the triggering of antidumping actions: changes in the 
exchange rate, fluctuations in the level of economic activity and the rate of import 
penetration. Monthly data on all of the variables are aggregated to quarters for our analysis 
because of the large number of months without new petitions
7
. 
The impact of these three determinants on antidumping filings is estimated with the 
OLISNET database of the OECD. The influence of each of these 3 variables is analysed both 
in the very short run (one year) and in the short/medium run (three years), except for the 
exchange rate whose fluctuations are considered only over a one-year period. 
2.2.1. General economic activity and industrial production 
The influence of the business cycle is evaluated with variations in real GDP or the index of 
the industrial production. More precisely, we use the average growth rate of GDP, as well as 
of the industrial production index, either over the previous year (specification #1) or over a 3-
year period before the filing date (specification #2)
8
.  
The average growth of real GDP of the filing country is denoted RGDP(-1) for specification 
#1 and RGDP(-3) for specification #2. Similarly, the average growth rates of industrial 
production are denoted INDPROD(-1) and INDPROD(-3). 
Economic theory, as well as common sense, suggests that “bad” economic situations reinforce 
the demand of protection, thus contributing to a resurgence of protectionism, while “boom” 
periods are likely to further trade liberalization. Nevertheless, the causality relationship is not 
quiteso simple, because trade policy also influences the economic situation. Protection tends 
to curb economic activity, while trade liberalization stimulates economic growth. Whatever 
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 The results of our estimations using monthly data can be obtained upon request. 
8
 This choice is explained below (see: 4.2). See also Feinberg (2003). 
the causal relationship might be, we can expect that filings are negatively related to the 
business cycle. A glance at the data confirms this relationship. For example, in 1992, an 
economic slump year, the number of antidumping procedures significantly increased
9
. 
2.2.2. The force of international competition 
The intensity of foreign competition suffered by country i is measured by the rate of import 
penetration (denoted RIMPi): 
RIMPi = 
i
j
ij
DD
M
  
With M ij  the imports of product j by country i (respectively the US and the EU) and 

j
ijM  its total imports.  
For the purposes of this paper, we consider the EU, like the US, as one single commercial 
entity, which means that we take into account only imports from extra-EU countries
10
. 
DDi is the domestic demand in country i 
DDi = PrCi + PuCi + INVi 
With: 
PrCi the private consumption in country i 
PuCi the public consumption in country i 
INVi the investments in country i 
Logically, an increase in the rate of import penetration should lead to greater demands 
forprotection in the importing country. Consequently, filings should be positively related to 
the import penetration rate.  
In our estimations, as for the GDP, we consider both 1-year and the 3-year average import 
penetration rates prior to the opening of the antidumping procedure. The rate of import 
penetration during the previous year is denoted RIMP (-1) while the average rate over the 3-
year prior to the filing date is denoted RIMP (-3). 
2.2.3. The foreign exchange rate 
The real exchange rate is the last of the three major macroeconomic determinants that we take 
into consideration. It is a major determinant of competitiveness. Intuitively, appreciation of 
the domestic currency, as it reduces the competitiveness of the country, will probably 
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 In 1992, the total number of filings in the world was equal to 326 while this number is usually around 200 per 
year.  
10
 Since the antidumping procedures initiated by the EU are targeted at trading partners outside the Union, it 
makes sense to consider only the intensification of extra-EU competitive pressure. 
strengthen protectionist claims. We test for a positive relationship between the number of 
quarterly filings and the real exchange rate. An appreciation of the domestic currency should 
increase the number of antidumping procedures. 
Bilateral real exchange rates of the US dollar and the euro vis-à-vis each of the target 
countries‟(listed in Tables 1 and 2) currencies are calculated on the basis of consumer prices. 
The real exchange rate series are normalized by dividing each rate series by its mean so as to 
offset the scale effect from one exchange rate to the other.  
We lag the real exchange rate by one year, because the national authorities (both in the US 
and in the EU) examine pricing issues over a one year period prior to the opening of 
investigations
11
. The one-year lagged real exchange rate is denoted RER(-1). 
3. Econometric estimation methodology 
The number of antidumping procedures is typical of count data. It is a discrete variable. We 
can model the probability of occurrence of any number of antidumping filing either with a 
Poisson or with a negative binomial regression. 
The Poisson regression model is defined by:  
ni
y
e
yYob
i
y
i
i
ii
.....,..2,1,)(Pr 
 
 
with: ii xLn
')(    and     ixiiiii exyVarxyE
'   
So, the estimated equation is: [Case of opening antidumping procedures] ' iLnE x  
)(Pr iyYo  is the probability that the quarterly number of filings (random variable Y) is 
equal to a particular value (yi). 
λi is the parameter of the Poisson distribution. It depends on several exogenous variables. 
These variables form a matrix denoted xi.  is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. 
Using a Poisson regression is appropriate if the variance and the expected value of the 
distribution are equal. Several authors underline the fact that this fundamental feature of a 
Poisson distribution may be violated in empirical applications
12
. In this paper, we use the test 
of over-dispersion suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (1990) in order to choose which 
regression model should be adopted. 
We test: 
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 See Knetter and Prusa (2003) and Feinberg (2003). 
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 See for example Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984), Cameron and Trivedi (1986). 
 
)()(:0 ii yEyVarH  against )()()(:1 iii ygyEyVarH    
This test is based on the hypotheses that: 
 
2
( ( ) ( )i i iy E y E y  has an average equal to zero and the Poisson model gives consistent 
values of )( iyE . 
Let us denote ii 
ˆ , where iˆ is the predicted value of i from Poisson regression.  
The test is carried out by testing the significance of the single coefficient in the linear ordinary 
least squares estimation of  
i
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When wi1 and wi2 are significantly different from 0, an over-dispersion of iy  is proved and the 
Poisson distribution must be rejected. As a consequence, we use the negative binomial model 
as a better alternative than the Poisson model. In the negative binomial model, the conditional 
variance and the conditional mean of iy  differ. 
  ny
y
e
yYob i
i
y
i
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where iii xLn  
')(  
i indicates the term of error or some sort of heterogeneity in the data. 
The non-conditional probability of iy  is obtained by integrating with respect to i. The choice 
of the density of i defines a non-conditional distribution. The Gamma distribution is often 
chosen in order to make calculations easier. So, we adopt this distribution. 
))(exp( iE  is supposed to be equal to 1 and  )var( i  
In order to simplify the formulation, the probability distribution is redefined with the θ 
parameter. 
The distribution function used to optimize the likelihood function is the following: 
)1(
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and   represents an over-dispersion parameter of iy . A negative value of   suggests that the 
data are inconsistent with the model.  
  is such that :  )(1)()var( iii yEyEy   
This relation exhibits the importance of the over-dispersion. The over-dispersion rate is given 
by: 
)(1
)(
)(
i
i
i yE
yE
yVar
  
4. Econometric Results 
4.1. Over-dispersion test 
The over-dispersion tests are carried out on the average growth rate of real GDP over the 3-
year period prior to the filing, as well as on the industrial production index over the same 
period. 
Table 3 shows that wi1 and wi2 are positive and significant both in the United-States and in the 
European Union. Hence, there is an over-dispersion of the number of antidumping filings in 
these two countries. This result leads us to choose a negative binomial model. Furthermore,  
the over-dispersion parameter, is also positive and significant in the various estimations based 
on the negative binomial model (as displayed in tables 5 and 6). The data are thus consistent 
with this model. 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the over-dispersion tests for the cases of opening 
antidumping procedures in the US and the EU carried out – respectively - over a one and a 
three-year period.  
Table 3: Over-dispersion test of the number of antidumping procedures (one year-period) 
Estimation by ordinary least squares 
Dependant variable, 
i
iii
i
yy
c


2
)( 2 
  
 
variables 
United States 
(1) 
European Community 
(2) 
wi1 0.4749
*** 
(3.172) 
0.1377
** 
(2.245) 
wi2 2.0985
*** 
(5.198) 
0.8705
** 
(2.626) 
***=significant at the 1% level.  **= significant at the 5% level. *= significant at the 10% level 
The t-statistics are in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
 
Table 4: Over-dispersion test of the number of antidumping procedures (three year-period) 
Estimation by ordinary least squares 
Dependant variable, 
i
iii
i
yy
c


2
)( 2 
  
 
variables 
United States 
(1) 
European Community 
(2) 
wi1 0.4654
*** 
(2.865) 
0.4637
** 
(2.461) 
wi2 0.5044
*** 
(3.423) 
0.7478
** 
(2.160) 
***=significant at the 1% level.  **= significant at the 5% level. *= significant at the 10% level 
The t-statistics are in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
 
4.2. Why two specifications?  
The WTO antidumping committee does not provide accurate indications about the time period 
which has to be taken into account in the investigations aimed at analyzing whether or not 
dumping is taking place and whether dumped imports are causing material injury. The 1994 
GATT agreement states that the period taken into consideration in the investigation of the 
existence of dumping „is normally one year, but should not in any case be less than 6 months‟. 
The recommendation of the WTO antidumping committee is representative of the absence of 
guidelines: according to this committee, the investigations meant for assessing the damages 
should normally cover at least 3 years, but they also can cover a shorter period
13
. This means 
that national authorities are completely free to adapt these periods to each specific case. The 
consequence is a large disparity of practices and legal frameworks from one country to 
another
14
.  
 In the US, the Department of Commerce (DOC) is in charge of determining dumping while 
the International Trade Commission (ITC) is in charge of injury determination. These two 
government agencies investigate over a 3-year period prior to the filing of the case. 
In the EU, the European Commission assesses both price behaviour and material injury. The 
usual procedure is to investigate whether or not dumping is taking place over a 6 to 12-month 
period (in most cases)
15
. After that, injury investigations are carried out by the Commission 
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 WTO recommendation May 5, 2000. 
14
 However, the dominant practices of the national authorities – consistent with the recommendations of the 
WTO antidumping committee – adopt a short period (typically one year) in the pricing behaviours investigations 
and a longer period (typically 3 years) in the material injury investigations. 
15
 This first step includes the calculation of the dumping margin. 
over a 3-year period
16
. However, in some cases, the time period applied to injury 
determination can be reduced to only one year
17
. 
Of course, the choice of one year instead of 3 years in injury assessment influences the 
identification of the determinants of antidumping filings. The choice of time period is an 
important specification issue. Assuredly, any choice is, to some extent, arbitrary. However, 
our 2 specifications (respectively based on a one-year period and a 3 three period) give a 
plausible approximation of the actual procedures of the reporting countries. In addition, this 
choice may be useful to differentiate the practices of the US and the EU. Lastly, it is also 
justified by the fact that Knetter and Prusa (2002) and Feinberg (2003) consider a one year lag 
for the foreign exchange rate and a 3-year period for the GDP, which will facilitate the 
comparison between their results and ours. 
 Due to the correlations among the growth rate of the GDP, the rate of import penetration and 
the index of industrial production, we develop three estimation models in which each of these 
variables is considered separately. These models are applied, for each specification (one or 
three years), both to the US and the EU, resulting in a total of 5 models to be estimated for 
each country
18
. 
In specification #1, we consider the real GDP growth rate, the average rate of import 
penetration and the industrial production index during the year prior to the antidumping filing 
(see columns i, ii, and iii in tables 5 and 6). 
In specification #2, we refer to these same variables over a 3-year period prior to the filing 
(see columns iv, v and vi in these same tables). The real exchange rate is present in all the 
specifications. 
After estimating the influence of each variable on the number of filings, we try to estimate 
eventual trend effects: does this influence change over time and if so in which direction?  
To this end, we identify a variable, TIME, defined as the date of the filing, expressed in 
number of quarters since the beginning of the period chosen (that is: since the beginning of 
1990). So, the TIME value associated with the first quarter of 1990 is equal to 1, the second 
quarter has a TIME value equal to 2, etc., up to 52 for the last quarter of 2002. 
We capture a possible interaction between each determinant variable and TIME by 
multiplying each variable by the log of TIME (Log-TIME). In order to simplify the 
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 In accordance with the WTO antidumping code, a causality relation must be established between dumping and 
injury to community industry. 
17
 See the WTO recommendation, G/ADP/6, May 16, 2000. 
18
 We do not  take into account the value of the EU import penetration rate because we have strong doubts about 
the import data extracted from the OECD database. We tried to use the data in the regressions, but the estimated 
values give us erroneous coefficients.  
interpretation of the estimated coefficients, we combine Log-TIME with the log of each 
determinant variable, except for the GDP real growth rate (which can be a negative value). 
 
4.3. Results 
To facilitate the comparison of our results with those of Knetter and Prusa (2002) and 
Feinberg (2003), we present in Tables 5 and 6 the incidence rate ratios (IRR) associated with 
the estimated coefficients. The Poisson regression model assumes that the incidence rate (i.e. 
the rate per unit at which a happening occurs) is a function of some underlying variables as 
follows: 
0 1 1 2 2 ...j j k kjx x xIr e
      
  
The expected number of occurrences is equal to this incidence rate multiplied by the exposure 
(the number of units of time over which observations are measured). The exposure is 
uninteresting in our case since each observation in the data set is the number of antidumping 
filings in a 1-year and 3-year interval  
 The IRR is a function of some underlying variables. IRR represents the ratio of (1) the counts 
predicted by the model when the variable of interest is one unit above its mean value and all 
other variables are at their means to (2) the count predicted when all variables are at their 
means also. Thus, if the IRR for the real exchange rate is 1.50, then a one unit increase in the 
real exchange rate (a 100% real appreciation given that we use the log of the real rate) would 
increase counts by 50% when all other variables are at their means. (Knetter and Prusa, 2003). 
The t-statistics are reported for a test of the null hypothesis that the IRR=1, which would 
imply no relationship between the dependant variable and the regressor. 
Tables A1 and A2 summarize the results of the negative binomial model. The coefficients 
generally have the expected signs. The chi-squared values obtained are high. Consequently, 
the tests of the likelihood ratios confirm the global significance of the models for the United 
States and the European Union. 
For the United States, the estimations are completed by estimations with temporal effect 
which take into account the interactions of three variables TXPIB (-1), LogTPIMP (-1) and 
LogINDEXPROD (-1) with LogTIME. For the European Union, we present the specifications 
without temporal effects because variables with temporal effects yield insignificant 
coefficients. 
 4.3.1. US Results 
4.3.1.1. Specification #1 
The IRR estimated for the exchange rate delayed one year LogTCR (-1) is 1.03 in columns 
(i), ii) and iii) of the table 5. That means a real appreciation of 100 % of the exchange rate 
would increase the openings of AD procedures to 3%. The integration of the temporal effect 
shows that a real appreciation of 100 % of the exchange rate delayed one year would reduce 
the number of AD procedure from 11 % to 12 % (the IRR is included between 0.88 and 0.86). 
The average rates of GDP growth, and import penetration and the index of industrial 
production are not significant. Their effects are thus considered as null, the IRR is fixed to 1. 
When we take into account the temporal effect, the IRR of LogTIME*TXPIB (-1) is 0.78, 
implying that a 22 % reduction in the number of openings of procedures is associated to an 
increase of 1 % of the GDP growth rate with temporal effect. The IRR of LogTIME*TPIMP 
(-1) is 0.31. An increase of 100 % of the import penetration rate of the United States would 
increase the number of openings of antidumping procedures to 69 % in the time period 
considered. Finally, the IRR of LogTIME*INDEXPROD (-1) is 1.08. An increase of 100 % 
of the index of industrial production would lead to an increase of 8 % of the number of 
openings antidumping procedures. 
On the whole, our results show that short variations in the level of general economic activity 
or in the level of industrial activity or in imports have no significant impact on the number of 
openings of antidumping procedures. Next we consider the results for longer periods. 
4.3.1.2. Specification #2 
 
Columns (iv), (v) and (vi) in Table 5 show that an appreciation of 100 % in the lagged real 
exchange rate would increase openings of antidumping procedures by 25 %. An appreciation 
of 100 % in the lagged real exchange rate with temporal effect LogTIME*LogTCR (-1) 
would reduce the number of procedures by 27 %. The directions of evolution of variables are 
coherent with those obtained by Feinberg (2003). It means that the positive relation between 
the real exchange rate and the opening of antidumping inquiry is a short term relation. Over a 
long period, the appreciation of the exchange rate would even tend to lower the number of AD 
procedures. 
The IRR of the average GDP growth rate XCDP(-3) is 0.09. A decline of a unity of the 
growth rate would thus increase the number of openings  of antidumping procedures by 91 % 
in the United States. This result confirms our expectations and is in accordance with the 
results of the previous studies: the slowing down and, to an even greater extent, the decline of 
the economic activity increase the openings of antidumping actions. In the phases of 
expansion, we note fewer antidumping procedures. In addition, LogTIME*XGDP(-3) does 
not have a significant effect. So in the long run, there would be no direct relation between the 
decline of the growth rate of the GDP and the increase in the number of antidumping 
procedures. In other words, the growth rate of the GDP can influence the opening of the 
procedures but only in the short-term.  
 
It is different when we take into account the index of industrial production. Indeed, the IRR of 
LogINDEXPROD (-3) is not significant. On the other hand, the IRR of 
LogTIME*LogINDEXPROD (-3) is 1.02. In the long run, an increase of the index of 
industrial production would thus engender an increase of 2 % in the number of antidumping 
procedures in the United States.  
Import penetration rate has a IRR which is practically null. An increase of 100 % of the 
import penetration rate would lead to an increase of 100 % of the number of procedures. This 
effect disappears in the long run (coefficient not significant for LogTIME*LogTPIMP (-3). 
This means that in the long run, the intensity of the foreign competition does not produce a 
significant effect on the initiations of antidumping actions. The influence of the competition is 
essentially cyclic. 
Table 5.IRR in the United States 
 
 
 
Variables 
  
Specification#1 : 
 
Specification#2 
 (i) (ii) (iii)  (iv) (v)  (vi) 
 
LogRER(-1) 
 
LogTIME* LogRER(-1) 
 
RGDP(-1) 
 
LogTIME* RGDP(-1) 
 
LogRIMP(-1) 
 
LogTIME* LogRIMP(-1) 
 
LogINDPROD(-1) 
 
LogTIME*LogINDPROD(-1) 
 
RGDP(-3) 
 
LogTIME* RGDP(-3) 
 
LogRIMP(-3) 
 
LogTIME* LogRIMP(-3) 
 
LogINDPROD(-3) 
 
LogTIME*LogINDPROD(-3) 
 
1.0303 
(2.749) 
0.8770 
(-2.945) 
1.00 
(0.268) 
0.7815 
(-2.417) 
 
 
1.0296 
(2.486) 
0.8763 
(-2.737) 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
(0,858) 
0,3117 
(1,649) 
 
1.0336 
(2.897) 
0.8652 
(-3.042) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2719 
(-3.098) 
1.00 
(2.952) 
 
1.2458 
(2.921) 
0.7354 
(-3.388) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0891 
(-2.298) 
1.2465 
(2.108) 
 
1.2511 
(3.107) 
0.7308 
(-3.566) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6E-05 
(1.981) 
1,00 
(1.052) 
 
1.2533 
(3.123) 
0.7327 
(-3.520) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
(-0.844) 
1.0179 
(1.667) 
 
 
4.3.2. EU Results 
4.3.2.1. Specification #1 
Columns (i) and (ii) in Table 6 show that the IRR of the real exchange rate lagged one year is 
1.02. So, an appreciation of 100 % of the real exchange rate would increase the number of the 
antidumping procedures to 2 %.  
The average rate of GDP growth during the year previous to the opening of the antidumping 
procedure is not significant. Short term variations in general economic activity thus do not 
seem to affect the openings of antidumping inquiries in Europe. 
This conclusion is qualified by the effect of the index of industrial production. Indeed, an 
increase of 100 % of LogINDEXPROD (-1) would increase the number of opening 
procedures by 14 % (because the IRR of the index of the industrial production is 0.856) in 
Europe.  
All in all only, short term variations in the branch of industry have a significant influence. 
4.3.2.2. Specification #2 
The real exchange rate always appears as a significant determinant of antidumping actions. 
According to our estimation, an appreciation of 100 % in the real exchange rate would lead to 
an increase in the number of the antidumping procedures from 13 % to 24 % (The IRR varies 
between 1.13 and 1.24). 
The average rate of growth during the three years which precede the opening of a procedure 
has a negative coefficient but is not significant. Cyclical variations thus seem to have hardly 
any influence on the openings of inquiries in Europe. This result is in accordance with what 
actually happens in Europe. On the other hand, the IRR of LogINDPROD (3) is 0.796. So, an 
increase of 100 % in the index of industrial production would reduce the number of anti-
dumping procedures to 20 %. 
Table 6. IRR in Europe 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Specification #1   
 
Specification #2 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 
LogRER(-1) 
 
RGDP(-1) 
 
LogINDPROD(-1) 
 
RGDP(-3) 
 
LogINDPROD(-3) 
 
 
1.0244 
(2.472) 
1.00 
(0.676) 
 
 
1.023 
(2.516) 
 
 
0.856 
(1.965) 
 
 
1.1351 
(2.604) 
 
 
 
 
1.00 
(-1.228) 
 
1.2431 
(3.751) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.7962 
(-2.374) 
 
 
4.4. Comparisons of results 
4.4.1. Comparison of the results between Europe and the United States 
The results obtained allow us to differentiate the influences that the macroeconomic factors 
exercise in the United States and in the European Union respectively. 
a) A first difference between the two is the fact that in Europe temporal effects are not 
significant in the model. A possible explanation of this result is that the European 
Union opened relatively few antidumping procedures over the period 1990-2002. The 
total of the openings of procedures is only 133 for the European Union against 292 for 
the United States. 
b) The exchange rate has a significant effect in the United States as well as in the 
European Union. The IRR in the United States is very close to those of the European 
Union. For the United States, we established the existence of a negative temporal 
effect of the real exchange rate lagged one year on the openings of procedures. This 
means that a preservation of the pattern (a continuous decline of the exchange rate) 
over the whole period would lead to a decrease of the number of inquiries. 
c) We can also note that the period used to estimate damages has a rather significant 
effect on the probability of an inquiry being opened. Thus, in Europe, when a period 
of one year is used to estimate the damage, the level of the IRR of the real exchange 
rate is around 2 % while it is around 24 % when a 3-year period is used. In the United 
States, when a period of 1 year is used to estimate the damage, we obtain an IRR from 
the real exchange rate of about 3 %. The IRR is around 25 % when a 3-year period is 
used. However, when the period of evaluation is of 1 year, the growth rate of the GDP 
is not significant in either Europe or the United States. A contrario, when we use a 
period of 3 years to estimate the damages, the GDP growth rate has a significant effect 
with a weak IRR in the United States. This is not the case in Europe.  
The influence of the differences in practices and the differences in the antidumping 
legislation thus appear clearly. Indeed, in the United States, contrary to Europe, the I.T.C. 
systematically uses a three-year period to determine the possible damage. 
 
d) The effect of intensification of international competition is null on a horizon of 1 year 
but very high in the United States on a three-year horizon. This effect is captured by 
the import penetration rate variable.  
e) Finally, the evolution of industrial production does explain antidumping petitions 
when the period of evaluation of the damages is 3 years in the United States. On the 
other hand, when we use a lag of 1 year to estimate damages, the impact of industrial 
production is significant. In Europe, we obtain opposite significant effects of industrial 
production when we use periods of one or three years to estimate the damages.  
Overall, three main conclusions can be drawn from this comparison: 
- Variations in the exchange rate are the best common explanation for both countries. 
- it The index of industrial production is a good "candidate" to characterize the 
European Union because is significant in Europe when the period for damage 
assessment is taken as being  1 year (as is the actual practice of the European 
Commission). However, the growth rate of the GDP only has a significant effect in the 
United States when we use a period of 3 years to estimate the damages (as is the actual 
practice of  the American authorities). 
- The choice of the period for the evaluation of the damages directly influences the 
estimate of the probability of an inquiry being opened. 
So the differences noted between the United States and Europe could be explained by the 
differences of rules and practices implemented by the authorities of regulation. This is a result 
not found in any of the former studies. 
4.4.2. Comparisons of the results obtained with those of Feinberg (1987, 2003) and Knetter-
Prusa ( 2003 ) 
Table 7 below gives a summary of all the obtained results. Prusa and Knetter (2003) found 
that a real appreciation of 100 % of the dollar would increase the number of procedures by 
267 % (with a ratio of rate of incidence of 3.67), all other variables being at their averages. 
Feinberg (2003) shows that a real appreciation of 100 % of the dollar would increase the 
number of procedures by 206% with a ratio of rate of incidence of 3.06. Our estimates are 
similar to those of previous studies, but with weaker IRR. A possible explanation may be 
found in the fact that our period of study extends over a shorter period (13 years from 1990-
2002), while both prior studies are for 19 years (1980-1998). Over the longer period, the 
number of observed procedures is greater. Furthermore, the earlier studies use annual data on 
a larger number of countries, whereas we use quarterly data. Finally, their estimates are based 
on negative binomial regressions with random effects. Our attempt at an estimate based on 
negative binomial  regressions for our chosen period of time was unsuccessful. 
 
Table 7. Comparisons with the relationships found in prior econometric studies 
 US EU 
Macroeconomic factor S1 S2 F or 
KP
a
 
S1 S2 
Exchange rate without temporal effect +
***
 +
***
 +
***
 +
**
 +
***
 
Exchange rate with temporal effect -
***
 -
***
 -
***
 ns ns 
GDP without temporal effect +ns
 
-
**
 -
**
 +ns
 
-ns
 
GDP with temporal effect -
**
 +
**
 +
**
 ns ns 
Industrial Production without temporal effect -
*** 
-ns
 
nd
b
 +
**
 -
**
 
Industrial Production with temporal effect +
*
 +
 * 
nd ns ns 
Import penetration rate without temporal effect +ns
 
+
**
 nd ns ns 
Import penetration rate with temporal effect +
*
 +ns
 
nd ns ns 
***= significant at the 1 % level. **= significant at the 5 % level *= significant at the 10 % level 
a 
This column compares our results with those obtained by Feinberg (1989, 2003) and by Knetter and Prusa (2003). 
b 
Na means not available (these variables were not studied in the previous works). Ns means not significant. 
 
 
5-CONCLUSION 
 
We have shown that macroeconomic variables have different effects on the numbers of 
openings of antidumping procedures in the United States and in Europe. First, an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate has a positive impact on openings of procedures in the United States 
and within the European Union. However, the dimension of the effect is much more important 
in the United States and the temporal effect of the exchange rate is present only in the United 
States. Next, the economic cycle (measured by GDP changes) has an impact on openings of 
procedures only in the United States. The intensification of foreign competition (measured by 
the import penetration rate) also increases openings of procedures in the United States. 
Openings are also influenced by the the very short term and\or medium-term level of general 
American economic activity, whereas they depend more specifically on the economic 
situation of the industry in Europe. These results show the influence of institutional 
differences, notably in the rules which prevail for the antidumping procedures on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The difference concerning the reference periods in the calculation of damages is 
perceptible in our results (a shorter period in the case of the European Union of the order of 
15 months against 3 years in the United States). It also seems that the European procedure is 
less effective – or, at least, offers a lesser degree of protection - than the American procedure 
when we consider the impact of the economic cycle, the influence of exchange rates and 
competitive pressures. Paradoxically, however, the European procedure seems more selective, 
perhaps more targeted, than the American procedure (we noted no significant relationship 
with the GDP in Europe, but a relationship with industrial production was found in Europe 
whereas the opposite was found for the United States). Future research should go beyond the 
simple explanation of openings of antidumping procedures undertaken in this study to take 
into account the impact of world competition. Also the impact of the definition of dumping in 
the WTO Agreements, which does not mention that the appreciation of the exchange rate can 
justify the opening of an antidumping inquiry, needs to be explored. For example, only cases 
of dumping which lead to a threat of monopolization of the market must now be sanctioned in 
the form of temporary or definitive antidumping rights. These two factors, world competition 
and the WTO definition of dumping may be found to have major responsibility for the current 
intensification of the use of non-tariff barriers, in particular institutional barriers to exchanges.   
This crawling neo-protectionism (Sandretto,1998) could eventually ruin the efforts of half a 
century to liberalize international exchanges and build a multilateral commercial system. The 
European Union and the United States should accept the responsibility for engaging in a 
“disarmament” process regarding these procedures by proposing an amendment to the 
Antidumping Agreement which would limit the discretionary power of the national 
authorities. It would also be advisable to increase transparency in the determination of 
damage, in the normal calculation of the value of damage, and in the determination of the 
dumping margin (Aussilloux, 2002).  
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APPENDEX 1 
  
Table A1 : Estimations of the coefficients in the negative binomial model for the United States 
 
 
 
Variables 
Estimation by the method of the maximum of likelihood 
Specification#1 : Specification#2 
 (i) (ii) (iii)  (iv) (v)  (vi) 
Constant 
 
LogRER(-1) 
 
LogTIME* LogRER(-1) 
 
RGDP(-1) 
 
LogTIME* RGDP (-1) 
 
LogRIMP (-1) 
 
LogTIME* LogRIMP (-1) 
 
LogINDPROD(-1) 
 
LogTIME*LogINDPROD(-1) 
 
RGDP(-3) 
 
LogTIME* RGDP (-3) 
 
LogRIMP (-3) 
 
LogTIME* LogRIMP (-3) 
 
LogINDPROD(-3) 
 
LogTIME*LogINDPROD(-3) 
0.9008
* 
(1.904) 
6.3892
*** 
(2.749) 
-2.1784
*** 
(-2.945) 
0.1280 
(0.268) 
-0.2465
** 
(-2.417) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
4.1314 
(1.068) 
6.2397
** 
(2.486) 
-2.1918
*** 
(-2.737) 
- 
 
- 
 
1.3112 
(0.858) 
0.1950
* 
(1.649) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-11.0543 
(-1.445) 
6.3722
** 
(2.512) 
-2.2351
*** 
(-2.747) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2.7869 
(1.522) 
-0.1270
* 
(-1.882) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
2.4019
* 
(1.890) 
8.0345
*** 
(2.921) 
-3.0286
*** 
(-3.388) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-2.4174
** 
(-2.298) 
0.2204
** 
(2.108) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
11.780
* 
(1.877) 
8.19
*** 
(3.107) 
-3.09
*** 
(-3.566) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
5.1364
** 
(1.981) 
0.1570 
(1.052) 
- 
 
- 
-19.966
** 
(-2.162) 
8.2823
*** 
(3.156) 
-3.0866
*** 
(-3.577) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
4.5338
** 
(2.097) 
-0.0876 
(-1.268) 
Over dispersion parameter Alpha 0.9979
*** 
(5.123) 
1.0532
*** 
(5.500) 
1.0445
*** 
(5.558) 
0.5611
** 
(2.459) 
0.592
*** 
(2.664) 
0.5747
*** 
(2.654) 
Log likelihood unrestricted. L0 
Log likelihood restricted. Lr 
Chi-squared
a 
Significance level 
Number of observations 
Degrees freedom 
-316.3238 
-364.5566 
96.46556 
0.0000 
220 
1 
-318.5656 
-369.3118 
101.4925 
0.0000 
220 
1 
-317.9812 
-368.3517 
100.7409 
0.0000 
220 
1 
-236.2167 
-245.2801 
18.1267 
0.207E-04 
180 
1 
 -236.63 
-247.14 
21.0202 
0.4E-05 
180 
1 
-245.7997 
-263.9425 
36.2856 
0.0000 
180 
4 
a-  2 02 ( ) ( )rLog L Log L     
***=significant at the 1 % level. **= significant at the 5 % level. *= significant at the 10 % level.  
The t-statistics are in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
 
Table A2 : Estimations of the coefficients in the negative binomial model for the European Union 
 
 
 
Variables 
Estimation by the method of the maximum of likelihood 
Specification#1 Specification#2 
 (i) (ii) (iii)  (iv) (v)  (vi) 
Constant 
 
LogRER(-1) 
 
RGDP(-1) 
 
LogRIMP (-1) 
 
LogINDPROD(-1) 
 
RGDP(-3) 
 
LogRIMP (-3) 
 
LogINDPROD(-3) 
 
28.7587
* 
(1.959) 
2.2779
** 
(2.472) 
0.2159 
(0.676) 
-  
 
-6.3574
** 
(-2.007) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -7.5772
** 
(-2.047) 
1.6682
** 
(2.570) 
- 
  
-3.0511
* 
(-1.857) 
- 
 
 - 
 
- 
 
- 
26.9755
* 
(1.915) 
2.1585
** 
(2.516) 
- 
 
- 
 
-5.9189
** 
(-1.965) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
1.1010 
(0.702) 
2.0702
* 
(2.604) 
- 
  
- 
  
- 
  
-1.6931 
(-1.228) 
- 
  
-  
-13.998
** 
(-2.490) 
3.1828
*** 
(3.830) 
-  
  
- 
  
- 
  
- 
 
-5.7427
** 
(-2.334) 
  
42.7595
** 
(2.326) 
3.5555
*** 
(3.751) 
-  
  
- 
  
- 
  
- 
  
- 
  
-9.3559
** 
(-2.374) 
Over dispersion parameter 
Alpha 
  
1.0511
** 
(2.410) 
 
1.04399
** 
(2.376)  
  
1.0525
** 
(2.404) 
 
 1.0995
** 
(2.112)  
  
0.9351
** 
(2.096) 
 
0.9255
** 
(2.042)  
Log likelihood unrestricted. L0 
Log likelihood restricted. Lr 
Chi-squared
a 
Significance level 
Number of observations 
Degrees freedom 
-208.5098 
-216.9596 
16.8996 
0.39E-04 
220 
1  
 -209.152 
-217.320 
16.335 
0.53E-04 
220 
1 
 -208.83 
-217.23 
16.8031 
0.41E-04 
220 
1 
 -166.22 
-173.40 
14.3407 
0.152E-03 
180 
1 
 -163.804 
-169.701 
11.794 
0.59E-03 
180 
1 
-163.6116 
-169.3583 
11.4934 
0.698E-03 
180 
1  
a-  2 02 ( ) ( )rLog L Log L     
***=significant at the 1 % level. **= significant at the 5 % level. *= significant at the 10 % level.  
The t-statistics are in brackets below the estimated coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
